iii ICTSD Programme on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development 
FOREWORD
Budgetary pressures in the United States may result in legislators changing key aspects of agricultural spending in the upcoming farm bill. In an environment of high farm incomes recipients of government funds are finding it increasingly difficult to justify the status quo. Trading partners of the US have long voiced their opposition to trade distorting elements of its agricultural policy.
The confluence of these factors may lay the groundwork for significant change.
Those close to the debate on U.S. agricultural policy in Washington D.C. have noted a near absence of discussion on WTO compliance. As one of the biggest agriculture spenders in absolute and per capita terms, the US has an impact on producers and consumers in other countries. The distortion caused to global trade by government policy may have been lower in recent years due, at least in part, to high international prices for key goods. However, many payments under proposed legislation are likely to remain and will perhaps be incorporated into a strengthened crop and revenue insurance programme. The crop prices used under such programmes will determine future budgetary outlays and may affect farmers' decisions. The structure of payments under these programmes, especially for cotton, rice, dairy and sugar, could shift production and prices abroad. Moreover, if current prices face a downward revision, US subsidies could increase sharply, nearing their WTO ceilings or fiscal limits.
The WTO Doha Round trade negotiations included limits on domestic support for agriculture as a key element. Although the round is currently at an impasse, the domestic support elements of the negotiating document, or draft modalities, have stabilized. In this context, national policies enacted independently of discussions in Geneva are likely to have significant impact in both setting the tone of talks when they resume and farm output in the interim. A proposed move away from direct payments to more trade distorting 'amber' and 'blue' box spending would backpedal on important reforms enacted in the US since the 1990s.
American agricultural policy, particularly where it concerns trade, is arguably a compromise between the producers and law makers, even in the context of reform. Many law makers, their constituents and the Obama Administration have focused on the importance of improved nutritional outcomes from subsidies, environmentally sound agricultural management and reducing waste. These are welcome steps in the right direction. However, as one of the most important traders of farm goods, US domestic policy plays an outsize role in global food security prospects, and the fate of large portion of vulnerable people in developing countries. A policy shift in the country often helps set the agenda elsewhere. An environment of fiscal accountability may be the right time for reform.
In the paper that follows, Bruce Babcock and Nick Paulson, leading experts on US commodity programmes, offer an analysis of how production of key farm goods will change due to proposals on the Farm Bill and the countries most likely to be affected by them. They offer insights on the development of US agricultural policy and the particularities of the current House and Senate proposals, including the proposed resolution of the Upland Cotton dispute between the US and Brazil through the Stacked Income Protection Plan. We hope that you find the paper as fruitful a contribution to the debate and the quest for solutions.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Although there is still some uncertainty about exactly when a new US farm bill will be passed, the content of its commodity support provisions are well known. The direct payment program will be eliminated. Marketing loans will be maintained. And farmers will likely be allowed to choose between a new revenue insurance program and a price insurance program that is a modification of the current countercyclical payment program. In an attempt to come into compliance with the World Trade Organization's cotton decision, US cotton subsidies will be provided through a new program call Stacked Income Protection (STAX).
The primary motivation for making these program changes is a desire by the US Congress to change the way that subsidies are delivered to farmers. Direct payments have fallen out of favor with both the public and farm groups because making payments to crop farmers when net farm income is at record levels is impossible to justify politically in the current economic climate. To increase the political acceptance of farm subsidies, Congress has focused on creating new programs that can be justified as providing farmers with a better "safety net." Supporters of farm subsidies believe that making payments to farmers when a "loss" occurs will increase the political viability of continuing farm payments. The Senate has passed its version of the farm bill, as has the House Ag Committee. The names of the new programs being proposed illustrate the attempt by Congress to focus on safety net programs. The cotton program's name shows that it will protect income. One problem that Congress has had to overcome in developing these new safety net programs is that the current US crop insurance program already provides farmers with a high level of protection against income losses. Because crop insurance premiums are so heavily subsidized, between 85 and 90 percent of crop acreage is insured in the program. But crop insurance policies must follow sound insurance principles. To make sure that farmers have an incentive to take care of their crop, the policies have a significant deductible. And to guard against adverse selection, the prices used in the program reflect prevailing market prices at the time that farmers sign their insurance contracts. These sound insurance practices have provided Congress with two rationales for their new farm bill programs. The insurance deductible is now characterized as a "shallow" loss that needs to be covered. Hence the farm bill's revenue insurance programs provide coverage on top of existing crop insurance coverage to reduce the insurance deductible. The fact that declines in market prices will be reflected in a reduction in the guarantees that crop insurance offers farmers opens shows that crop insurance cannot protect farmers against losses caused by declines in farm prices that last more than one year. Hence the need for a price insurance program that contains price guarantees that do not change for the life of the farm bill. In addition both revenue insurance programs set their guarantees using five-year Olympic averages of past prices so price declines are not immediately reflected in the guarantees.
The problem with designing programs that cover the risks that crop insurance does not is that they have the potential to influence farmer's planting decisions. If the influence is great enough, then program-induced changes in US crop acreage will be reflected in trade flows and world prices, and have the potential to harm farmers in developing countries. The likelihood that the new programs will influence planting decisions is enhanced because payments in all the new programs are calculated using actual planted acreage. The overall thrust of the new farm bill is that decoupled direct payments that have minimal impact on planting decisions will be replaced by coupled safety net programs that potentially have a large impact on planting decisions.
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Coupled farm program payments influence planting decisions both by increasing the overall profitability of farming and by changing the relative returns to planting alternative crops. Increased overall profitability from crop production will tend to increase total planted acreage which is then allocated between crops. Changes in relative returns will influence the share of total crop acreage planted to each crop. Thus, to estimate the potential impact of the proposed new farm bill programs on trade and prices requires an estimate of how they will affect expected returns to crop production. The average change in expected returns to planting, corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton and rice due to adoption of the proposed farm bill programs were estimated using a stochastic model that accounts for price and yield variability. The results indicate that if average prices stay at the levels projected by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO), then the changes in expected returns from the program will be modest and lower than the direct payments that farmers currently receive. The overall increase in expected revenue minus variable production costs across the five modeled crops is 4.6 percent. This estimate assumes that corn, soybean, rice and wheat farmers choose the program option that maximizes their returns and cotton farmers have the STX program. If average price levels rise above CBO projections, then the impact on expected returns of the new programs will decrease. If average prices decline by 15 percent per year for the first three years of the farm bill, then expected returns from the lower prices. Expected returns decrease by 51 percent with the programs in place. The current severe drought that is impacting major US production regions has increased prices substantially above CBO-projected levels. This suggests that it is more likely that average prices during the farm bill period will be higher than what CBO projects rather than lower.
The responsiveness of aggregate planted acreage in the United States to increased crop returns since 2006 has been low. A recent study used recent and estimated that a 50% increase in average returns to US crop production would lead to a 1.5% increase in total planted acreage. Use of this estimated responsiveness that the 4.6 percent increase in crop returns from the new farm bill programs using CBO average prices would increase aggregate planted acreage of the five modeled crops by 0.14 percent or by 233,000 acres. The smaller drop in expected returns due to the programs being in place under the low price scenario keeps 1.3 million acres in production that otherwise would have gone out of production.
The larger impact of the new farm bill program comes from their impact on relative returns between crops. Changes in the share of aggregate acreage for each of the model crops was estimated using a method developed by Matt Holt to allocate crops based on a competition matrix of own and cross price elasticities. Results show that the new programs will have the largest impact on cotton acreage because the cotton supply elasticity is higher than other for other crops and the programs increase expected returns to cotton by the largest percentage. This result implies that cotton producing countries, such as Brazil, India, Mali, and Pakistan would be affected most by the new US farm programs. In the low price scenario, acreage is allocated away from corn and soybeans to wheat as well because the target price for wheat is higher relative to market price than the other two crops. This results suggests that if prices drop, then wheat producing countries could be impacted as well by the new programs. The overarching thrust of all these new programs is to provide farmers with an improved farm safety net. With the exception of PLC, these new programs are variations of "shallow loss" programs that are designed to make payments supplemental to the "deep loss" payments from existing crop insurance products. 
INTRODUCTION
THE CURRENT STATE OF US COMMODITY SUPPORT
US farmers who produce program crops 4 are eligible for direct payments, countercyclical payments, and marketing loans. Direct payments are fixed payments that are made to eligible farmers without regard to which crops are planted, 5 or market conditions. Hence they are close to pure decoupled payments. Countercyclical payments are made when the season average price received by farmers falls below the program's trigger price, which as shown in Table 1 , equals a crop target's price minus the direct payment rate. A quick comparison of current market prices given in the first two rows of Table 1 to the countercyclical trigger prices shows that with the exception of cotton, all market prices are far above the trigger price. This divergence of program prices from market prices is a good thing for opponents of farm price supports because the countercyclical program will not trigger payments. But many farm payment supporters argue that the trigger prices need to be increased to provide farmers support if market prices fall from their current lofty levels. Marketing loans offer little or no incentive to change planting decisions because because crop loan rates are so far below market prices, as shown in Table 1 . The 2008 farm bill also gave farmers the option to choose to participate in ACRE (Average Crop Revenue Election), which is a revenue insurance program that insures against declines in state revenue. The price used to set the ACRE guarantee is based on the previous two years of market prices. Hence high market prices are readily reflected in the insurance guarantee, which is why the ACRE price guarantee is so close to current market prices. Only a small proportion of farmers chose to participate in ACRE perhaps because the program was new. The significance of ACRE is that it was the first commodity program that incorporates elements of a revenue insurance program and the first commodity program that automatically increases support levels in response to increases in market price. Both of these attributes feature prominently in the new programs being proposed for 2012. Table 2 shows the proportion of premium paid by taxpayers for the different coverage levels and the proportion of planted acres in 2011 that were insured at each coverage level. As can be readily seen, a large proportion of U.S. crops are insured and, with the exception of rice, a large proportion of the crop is insured at fairly high coverage levels. About 70 percent of the 2011 corn crop was insured at coverage levels of 70 percent or above. About 67 percent of the soybean crop and 56 percent of the wheat crop were insured at 70 percent or above coverage levels. At the 70 percent coverage level, a crop insurance indemnity will be paid to farmers if the farmlevel revenue or yield loss is greater than 30 percent. That is, the 70 percent coverage level is the same as a 30 percent deductible policy. About 90 percent of acreage is insured against losses in revenue, which means that either a price decline or a yield decline or both can be the cause of the loss. 6 The price used to set the insurance year is adjusted each year and reflects the level of harvest time futures prices at the time that insurance contracts are signed before the crop is planted. The US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the U.S. crop insurance program will cost taxpayers in excess of $8 billion per year over the period covered by the 2012 farm bill. Actual costs will vary from year to year depending on the severity of crop losses. Given the high cost of the program, the large proportion of farmers who participate in the program, and the high coverage levels that farmers are buying, it is somewhat surprising that Congress has concluded that farmers need a stronger safety net to be provided by commodity programs. There are a number of reasons for why Congress has reached this conclusion. First, it seems that political support for the direct payment program has largely vanished because of the difficulty in justifying sending $5 billion per year to crop farmers who are experiencing record income levels because of high market prices. Thus Congress needs a new way to deliver support to farmers that can be made to look more acceptable to the public. Second, the crop insurance program has a deductible that farmers absorb before the insurance is triggered. By definition, farmers who operate on thin margins may already be losing money on their crop before the insurance is triggered. Third, the distribution of realized losses in the crop insurance program has historically favored certain crops and regions. For example, loss ratios for corn and soybeans in the Midwest have historically been lower than for crops grown in the South. Hence, some farm groups have called for an improved safety net that helps them manage the "shallow" losses that are not covered by crop insurance. It is fortuitous for farm groups that farmers' expressed desire for help in covering their insurance deductible so neatly fits with Congress' desire to find politically palatable way to deliver support to farmers.
Corn
Coverage
Losses not covered by crop insurance because of the program's deductible provide a readymade definition of a farm loss that can be used to justify payments from a new program. Thus was born the new commodity programs designed to cover shallow losses.
One political difficulty in using direct payments to fund a new insurance program to cover shallow losses is that the benefits of such an insurance program will flow to all crops under the same set of rules. Examples of such rules include the proportion of the deductible that is targeted and the proportion of the loss that is covered. This means that all crops will benefit by roughly the same amount from the program, with variations in average payments based on the variability of yield and price for each crop. But direct payments disproportionately favor producers of crops grown primarily in the U.S. South, including rice, cotton and peanuts. Thus trading in the direct payment program that favors southern crops for a program that treats crops much more equally is not that appealing to southern farmers. This explains why members of Congress from the South have complained about the shallow loss program only "working" for corn, soybeans, and wheat. The House farm bill placates these regional interests through the new price insurance program (PLC), which is simply a re-defined countercyclical program with higher target prices. Using the justification that such a program fills the need for insurance coverage in the event of losses caused by multipleyear declines in market prices that are not covered by crop insurance (recall that crop insurance prices are reset every year to avoid influencing planting decisions) the House increased target prices substantially for rice and peanuts to offset a greater proportion of their direct payment decline.
To summarize, Congress is poised to use funds from the politically-indefensible direct payment program to pay for new, more politically-palatable programs that can be defended as only making payments when a farm suffers a loss. These new insurance-like programs will likely be adopted despite the existence of a costly crop insurance program that provides effective insurance coverage to a large proportion of US crops. In fact, the "losses" that are defined by the new farm bill 8 ICTSD Programme on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development programs are purposely not covered by crop insurance because to cover them would distort farmers' planting decisions. These include insurance deductibles that serve the purpose of making sure that farmers plant crops that are suitable for their farm and that planted crops are properly cared for, and "losses" caused by multiple year price declines which, of course, is like insuring a burning house against losses from fire. Covering these sources of loss has the potential for distorting farmers' planting decisions, which has the potential for distorting trade and world market prices and causing harm to producers in developing countries. Before turning to the extent to which the new programs may distort planting decisions, how the programs will actually work needs to be discussed.
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PROGRAM DESIGN
It is fair to say that there never has been a more complicated set of programs being considered at any one time by Congress. The complexity comes about both in terms of the payment formulas and because farmers are going to have to make a one-time choice about program options with a poor understanding of how the programs actually work. Under the Senate farm bill farmers can choose between individual and county coverage under ARC, as well as additional subsidized insurance coverage through SCO Combining SCO with either ARC option does increase the deductible for SCO coverage from 10 percent to 21percent. Thus, only farmers choosing individual or area-based insurance at coverage levels below 80 percent would receive additional coverage from SCO when combined with either ARC option. Cotton farmers have it easier because they only have to choose the payment multiplier; a choice that should be easy given the 80 percent premium subsidy. Under the House bill farmers will need to choose between revenue insurance coverage (RLC) and a target price program (PLC). If they choose PLC then they can also buy SCO with a 70 percent premium subsidy.
Farmers are going to have a difficult time choosing between these options because ARC and RLC use prices to set guarantee levels that are based on a five-year average price. SCO uses the crop insurance price and PLC uses a fixed target price. If market prices are higher than target prices and higher than past market prices, then SCO is the preferred option because it bases coverage on the current high market price. If market prices drop significantly, then ARC and RLC are preferred to SCO if the Olympic average price is higher than market prices. PLC may be preferred by all farmers if market prices fall enough because the lower market prices will never be reflected in the price guarantees. Furthermore, the choice between commodity programs (i.e. ARC, RLC or PLC) will be made on a onetime, irrevocable basis under both House and Senate bills, which highlights the importance of making an informed decision among these complex options. The next section provides more insight into these choices.
The new programs being proposed by the House and Senate and that are described in this section are as follows:
Each of these is described in turn. A mathematical expression that describes how each program's payments are calculated is provided in Appendix A.
Agricultural Revenue Coverage (ARC) (Senate) is a revenue insurance program that covers a portion of a farmer's crop insurance deductible. It would be administered as an optional commodity title program under the Farm Services Agency (FSA). No premium will be charged for ARC coverage. Farmers electing ARC program coverage will be asked to choose between county-based coverage and farm based coverage. In addition, they will need to opt out of ARC completely if they want to buy expanded coverage under SCO. Payments under individual-ARC cover 65 percent of planted acres for per-acre whereas county-ARC covers 80 percent of planted acres. Revenue shortfalls between 79 percent and 89 percent of the program guarantee are covered.
Price Loss Coverage (PLC) (House) is a target price program that makes payments based on planted acres. It differs from the current countercyclical program because farmers can choose to update their program yields used to calculate payments to 90 percent of the average yield from 2008 to 2012. The payments are made on 85 percent of planted acres. PLC target prices are shown in Table 3 .
Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) (Senate and House) will be administered as a crop insurance program under the Risk Management Agency (RMA). Farmers will be asked to pay 30 percent of the amount that is needed to cover expected program payments. That is, they will be receiving a 70 percent premium subsidy. For a farmer who selects ARC, SCO is designed to cover losses between the farmer's crop insurance level and the 79 percent coverage level floor provided by ARC. For a farmer who does not select ARC, SCO is designed to cover losses above the farmer's coverage level. Before an SCO payment can be made, however, the county must suffer a 10 percent loss.
Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX) (Senate and House)
is only for cotton and is designed to make the US cotton program comply with the WTO cotton ruling. The program will be administered by the Risk Management Agency and farmers will receive an 80 percent premium subsidy rate. The only difference between the Senate and House payment formulas is that the House version does not allow the price to be used in the insurance guarantee to fall below $0.6871 per pound of cotton. Cotton farmers would need to choose a payment multiplier between 0.8 and 1.2. This multiplier increases or reduces each farmer's total amount of insurance. Given that the premium subsidy for STAX is so high most farmers will likely choose the maximum payment multiplier.
Revenue Loss Coverage (RLC) (House) is version of a shallow loss revenue insurance program. Under the House Ag Committee bill, farmers would choose between RLC and PLC.
A farmer that chooses RLC could not participate in SCO. Other differences with ARC is that RLC only provides county based revenue insurance and in the calculation of the price used to set the revenue guarantee, RLC replaces a year's market price with the PLC fixed target prices (given below) in the calculation of the Olympic average of the average price used to set the RLC revenue guarantee if the market price falls below the target price level in any year. 
MAGNITUDE OF EXPECTED PAYMENTS
Both the Senate and the House Ag Committee's farm bills eliminate decoupled direct payments, which are reported by the United States as unlimited Green Box payments, in favor of coupled programs that make payments based on planted acres and actual yields. All the new programs base payments on current planted acres and current market prices, although farms cannot receive payments on acreage exceeding their total base acreage. The individual ARC program bases payments on farm-level yields. County ARC, RLC, SCO and STAX, base payments on county yields while PLC payments are made on base yields which may be updated. The use of countylevel yields and the limit on payment acres to total base acreage are the only aspects of any of the programs which maintain some degree of decoupling.
But the fact that the programs are coupled does not necessarily imply that the programs will have a significant effect on US farmers' planting decisions, which is a necessary condition for the programs to affect world prices and other countries' farmers. Planting decisions will be impacted if the programs create a large enough payment incentive for farmers to respond to the program rather than the market. A key measure of the extent to which programs incentivize a change in decisions is the increase in revenue that can be obtained from the program by increasing acreage to one crop or another. Thus before we can estimate the impact of the programs on planting decisions we need to estimate their impact on revenue.
There are two approaches that one can take to estimate the impact of a program on future payments. The first approach assumes a level of yield and price and then calculates the payments that would be made. The problem with this approach is that the level of yields and prices in the future cannot be known today. The alternative approach is to assume a distribution of future yields and prices and then estimate the distribution of payments Before presenting the results some general conclusions about the potential magnitude of the payments can be made just by an examination of the payment formula. Individual ARC payments per planted acre cannot be greater than 6.5 percent of the product of the Olympic average of price and the Olympic average of yield because ARC only covers between 79 and 89 percent of this product and payments are made on 65 percent of acres. County ARC payments cannot be greater than 8.0 percent of a product of Olympic averages, and RLC payments cannot be greater than 8.5 percent. The actual expected payment from these programs will be much lower than these maximum payments unless the probability of receiving revenue insurance payments is very high. The only way that the probability of receiving a payment is very high is if the market price is far below the price used to set the revenue guarantee. Thus, we can conclude that the extent to which ARC or RLC will distort planting decisions is limited unless market prices unexpectedly fall.
With regards to SCO payments, because SCO works much like the current plans of areabased insurance, such as Group Risk Plan (GRP)
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and Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP), albeit with higher subsidy levels, the degree to which SCO will distort planting decisions is only modestly higher than distortions caused by the current crop insurance program. Because SCO uses a crop insurance price to set guarantees, there cannot be a situation where the price used to set guarantees is much higher than what the market already provides farmers.
When combined with support from the marketing loan program, the only limits on PLC payments are those that limit overall commodity payments to farmers, which experience has shown are widely circumvented. Hence, PLC likely has the most potential to distort planting decisions. However, if market prices are far above the PLC target prices, then planting distortions caused by PLC will be insignificant. Distortions will likely occur when market prices at planting time are above but close to the target prices or market prices are below target prices. In this case, it is clear that PLC payments will be distorting. The model used in this analysis calculates payments for 100 farms for each county for each of 25,000 price draws. The number of price draws was determined by up to 50 years of county yield data and drawing 500 prices for each year. Many different summary statistics of the results could be presented but because the purpose of this paper is to estimate the degree to which the 2012 farm bill could impact world prices and developing countries, the most relevant summary statistics are the change in expected revenue that farmers will receive from the programs. Thus, presented below for each program are the expected payments by crop for each of the five years of the farm bill (2013 to 2017) and an average expected payment across the five years.
The programs that do not reflect current year market conditions in the price used to set the guarantee include ARC, RLC, and PLC. For these three programs, payments will be much lower than what we report under the assumption that average annual prices exactly replicate CBO projections. Because expected payments for most programs under CBO prices are already quite modest, there is no purpose in reporting payments when prices are stronger than CBO projections. But if average prices weaken, payments from ARC, RLC, and PLC will increase significantly, and the potential for market distortions from the program is much greater. Thus we simulate and report expected payment levels for these three programs in a declining price environment. Average expected STAX payments for cotton are about double average corn expected payments. A $30 per acre expected payment with a national average yield of 700 pounds per acre represents a 4.2 cent per pound increase in expected price, which is a 6.1 percent price increase at a price of 70 cents per pound. This 6.1 percent increase is about three times as large as the equivalent price increase for corn, soybeans, rice and wheat. This demonstrates that the STAX program has the potential to increase cotton plantings at the expense of other crops, an issue that we examine in the next section. Average PLC payments are presented in Table  9 . In simulating PLC payments, it was assumed that all farmers for all crops would update their program yields. In reality, some farmers would find their old program yields to be higher and they would not update. Because the corn, wheat, and soybean PLC target price is so far below CBO projected prices, PLC payments for these crops are quite low. However, the high PLC target price for rice relative to CBO-projected rice prices makes average rice payments much higher than under any other program option. This dramatic increase in expected payment from PLC is consistent with the stated objective of House leadership to make the House farm bill more favorable to rice than to the other major crops. 8 At an average yield of 6800 pounds per acre and a price of 14 cents per pound the average rice payments are equivalent to a price increase of 6.6 percent, which has the potential for creating a significant incentive for US farmers to plant more rice. The magnitude of the average payments from the new Senate and House programs are rather modest overall. 9 Only cotton STAX payments and rice PLC payments might be expected to create a significant incentive to plant more cotton and rice. And, as discussed above, if prices move higher during the period covered by the farm bill, which they seem likely to do at least in the first year or two because of the severe US drought that is impacting 2012 production of corn and soybeans, then the actual payments that will be received by farmers from these programs will likely be lower than reported here. If this occurs, then SCO becomes a preferred option because the price guarantees will reflect the higher market However, if prices move unexpectedly lower, then average payments from RLC, PLC, and ARC could increase substantially. To simulate the effects of lower average prices on payment levels, the average prices shown in Table 10 were input into the model. These prices reflect a 15 percent decline in price levels from CBO projected levels in each of the first three years, and then remain at these lower levels for the final 2 years of the farm bill. ARC and STAX payments are presented in Table 11 . The effects of using an Olympic average to determine the price used to set the ARC guarantees is reflected in the pattern of payments. Average expected payments increase rapidly at first when the price guarantee is greater than the average market price. Then as the lower market prices enter the Olympic average, the price guarantee decreases and so too does the average expected payment. For corn, payments reach a peak at $41 per acre in 2016. At 150 bushels per acre and a price of $2.79, this payment is equivalent to a price increase of almost 10 percent. Maximum soybean payments are equivalent to a 15 percent price increase; maximum wheat payments are equivalent to a 8 percent price increase; and maximum rice payments are equivalent to a 10 percent price increase. STAX payments for cotton do not follow the same pattern because of the floor on price used in that program. The $69 average STAX payment in 2017 is equivalent to a price increase of 23 percent at the lower prices shown in Tables 12 and 13 . RLC payments follow the same pattern of ARC payments due to the effect of the Olympic average. But now RLC payments are higher than ARC payments. The reason for this is that when the price used to set the revenue guarantee for ARC or RLC is below prevailing market prices, increasing yield variability decreases the likelihood of receiving a payment. To see why, consider what happens if there is no yield variability and prices are always below the price guarantee. Then there is a 100 percent chance that a payment will be received. Adding in yield variability means that there is now a chance that a high yield will result in enough revenue to exceed the revenue guarantee. Adding in more yield variability increases the chances further, which is why RLC payments are greater than ARC payments at the farm level.
Corn
PLC payments under the low price scenario are large because the fixed PLC target prices are higher than prevailing market prices. Expected price increases that are equivalent to the maximum PLC payments in Table 13 are 24 percent for corn, 60 percent for rice, 46 percent for soybeans, and 35 percent for wheat. These results just demonstrate that adopting fixed target prices that are higher than prevailing market prices has the most potential to distort planting decisions and subsequent trade quantities and world market prices. The distortionary effects of the ARC and RLC programs are smaller for the later years in the low price scenario as the their guarantees adjust to the lower price levels over time. 
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All the programs considered here base their payments on planted acreage rather than on base acres. This re-coupling of program payments means that farmers' incentives to grow a particular crop will be influenced by the level of expected payments that each crop may receive from the program. In addition, these programs also provide incentives to increase total planted acreage of all eligible program crops. While payments from the ARC and RLC/PLC commodity programs are limited to total base acreage and subject to total payment limitations, an increase in total acres will still lead to larger payments in years when payments are triggered for specific crops which do not exceed total base acreage for the farm. Furthermore, no limitations on payments or eligible acreage exist for the SCO program.
There are two economic forces that will work to increase acreage because of coupled farm payments. The first is that payments increase the overall profitability of crop farming. This will tend to increase total planted acreage. Barr, et al estimated the U.S. crop acreage response to the sharp increase in crop returns since 2006. The study estimated that a 50% increase in returns would lead to a 1.5% increase in total planted acreage. This estimate of overall planted acreage response is used in this study. That is, if farm programs increase expected crop returns by 20%, then total acreage planted to these five crops will increase by 0.6%.
The second economic force that drives crop acreage is competition between crops for land. Programs can affect this competition when they deliver different levels of payments for different crops. For example, expected payments to rice are much greater than other crops. Thus adoption of PLC payments will create an incentive for US farmers to plant relatively more rice than other crops. The method by which we translate differential changes in crop returns (expected revenue minus variable production costs) into a change in the share of acreage allocated to each crop follows closely a method developed by Holt in 1999. The method requires specification of a "land competition matrix" that contains elasticities that are translated into coefficients of a linear equation that can be used to calculate how land share changes with a change in crop returns. This approach was implemented using national acreage data and national returns data. Details about the method are available upon request.
Ideally, modeling the competition for land between crops should be done at a more disaggregated level than at the national level, but such estimates are beyond the scope of this study.
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To implement the method requires an estimate of expected crop returns for each crop. Expected market revenue for each crop in each county was set equal to the product of the average price used in the simulations and national trend yield for each crop. Variable production expenses were calculated by multiplying expected yield by per-unit variable production expenses that are reported below in Table 14 . These per-unit production expenses were taken from January 2012 CBO baseline projections. The resulting expected returns for each crop are shown in Table 15 for both sets of average prices. 11 To account for other crops grown in the U.S. a category of "other" crop also is included in the analysis with acreage equal to 78 million.
IMPACT ON PLANTING DECISIONS on Developing Countries
The method used to estimate the change in acreage from the new farm bill programs is to simply estimate the percentage increase in expected returns to each crop, which is then used to estimate the aggregate percentage returns to growing all of these crops. The aggregate change in expected returns is used to determine the overall increase in crop acreage. The crop specific percentage change in expected returns is used to estimate the change in acreage share for each crop. Planted acreage under the new farm bill then equals the new share multiplied by the new aggregate acreage.
The scenario that will likely change acreage the most at CBO baseline prices is if rice farmers choose the PLC program, all cotton farmers utilize the STAX program, and all other farmers choose the ARC farm-level program. All payments are treated as if they are equivalent to expected price increases. That is, the difference in degree of coupling between STAX, which pays out on county yields, and ARC, which pays out on county or farm yields, and PLC, which pays out on program yields, is not accounted for. Thus, the changes in expected returns that determine farmers' planting decisions overstate somewhat the actual incentive to increase acres.
The payments increase aggregate expected returns by 4.61 percent. Thus aggregate acreage of the five crops examined increases by 0.138% (.03 X .0461). Given CBO baseline acreage of these five crops 2015 under current programs of 232,567 thousand acres, the programs increase aggregate acreage of these five crops by 321 thousand acres. The allocation of this acreage to the various crops is presented in 
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Cotton has the largest percentage change in acreage. The reason for this is that the percentage change in revenue for cotton from the STAX program is the highest. In addition, the responsiveness of cotton supply is greater than for other crops. The acreage changes for the remaining crops are not economically significant.
These results show that the new farm program will have little impact crop acreage decisions for the major field crops of corn, soybeans, and wheat if average prices during the farm bill remain in the range projected by CBO. The STAX program will boost production modestly, which suggests that the only countries potentially affected by the new farm bill programs under this price scenario are cotton producing countries.
The effects of the US farm bill will be more significant if prices decline. The central finding of this report is that the recoupling of farm support to planted acreage in the new U.S. farm bill proposals will increase planted acreage of those crops which receive a higher guarantee relative to market price levels than other crops, particularly when market prices fall below support prices. The list of crops to be covered by the new programs and some of the developing countries that produce these crops are shown in Table 18 . Id a systemic decrease in crop prices occurs sometime in the next five years then it is likely that at least some of these countries will be adversely impacted by the U.S. farm bill.
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If Congress manages to pass a new farm bill this year it seems quite likely that the direct payment program and the countercyclical program will be eliminated and replaced with new insurance-like programs. Farmers will likely be given a choice of additional revenue insurance coverage on top of their current crop insurance coverage or price insurance through a new target price program, or a combination of both. All new program options currently being considered would provide coupled support in that farmers can influence the size of their payment through their production decisions.
Replacing decoupled programs with coupled programs would seem to significantly increase the likelihood that farmers' production decisions will reflect program provisions rather than market prices, thereby affecting aggregate production, world prices, and the incomes of developing country farmers. But experience over the last six years in which crop prices have been particularly strong indicates that the aggregate response of US crop acreage to profitability is quite inelastic. This suggests that overall production of US subsidized crops will not be significantly impacted by the new programs. Rather, the impact of the new programs will primarily be reflected in a change in the mix of crops that are planted.
If commodity prices stay high, then the only way that significant distortions to planting decisions could occur with the new programs is if target prices are increased too much. In the House bill, the rice target price and the floor on prices used to determine the House's version of the new cotton program's revenue guarantee levels are both close to current market prices. This closeness is reflected in significant average expected payments to both crops. At CBO price levels, the STAX program is estimated here to increase cotton planted acres by between four and five percent. Rice acres increase by smaller amount because US rice supply is quite inelastic. If commodity prices rise over the life of the farm bill then payments from the new programs will play an insignificant role in determining farmers' production decisions. Crop insurance programs will provide farmers with increasing levels of support in this price scenario. Farmer participation in the expanded crop insurance options will be expected if prices increase.
If prices decline significantly from CBOprojected levels, then payments from the new farm bill programs would increase significantly because the programs' guarantee levels are either fixed or adjust slowly to changes in market prices. Under this scenario, the overall acreage response will be small, but farmers would be expected to move to crops that are treated relatively well by the new programs. Because of the proposed high target price for rice in the House bill and the floor put on cotton price guarantees under the STAX program, acreage will tend to expand in favor of these two crops. In addition, the proposed wheat target price increases wheat revenue relatively more than corn and soybean revenues are increased by their proposed target prices. Hence under a low price scenario wheat acreage will increase at the expense of corn and soybean acreage.
The probability that commodity prices will move significantly lower than assumed by CBO has decreased significantly for the first year or two of the farm bill because of the severe drought affecting the US Midwest. The drought has caused current futures prices for corn, soybeans and wheat to soar. They will likely only moderate in the next year or two if US ethanol plants decide to suspend operations, which will occur only if the US government relaxes its mandates. This suggests that while it is possible that prices will decline to levels that would cause the proposed farm bill programs to negatively impact developing country farmers, it is not likely to do so until potentially the last three years of the five years to be covered by this farm bill. 
CONCLUSIONS on Developing Countries
ENDNOTES
4
Eligible crops include corn, wheat, soybeans, rice, cotton, peanuts, oats, barley, grain sorghum, sunflower, pulse crops and so-called minor oilseeds. This study analyzes the impacts of program changes on corn, soybeans, wheat, rice and cotton.
5
The one exception is that if farmers choose to plant fruits, vegetables, or tree nuts on program base acreage then direct payments will be lost. This restriction affects relatively few farmers in the major growing regions for program crops.
6
Almost all farmers buy a peculiar form of revenue insurance that is designed to cover losses from forward contracting. If the price at harvest is greater than the price at planting, this protection calculates loss payments at the higher harvest price. Thus farmers who suffer a yield loss can actually receive more income than they had originally projected at planting.
7
ARC and RLC as proposed would use as the average national price for each crop across the first five months of the marketing year as the actual price to determine payment levels. Hence the 2012/13 five-month price will be known in the first part of January of 2013 so it can be used to determine payments for the 2012 program year.
8
Although not reported here, expected payments to peanut farmers from PLC are also much higher than for other crops, which is also consistent with the House wanting to make higher payments to crops grown in the South.
9
The distribution of payments is highly skewed because payments are truncated at zero. The 2015 average per-acre payments conditional on market price falling at least one standard deviation is $26.37, $180.10, $5.98 and $29.95 for corn, rice, soybeans and wheat respectively. These average payments rise to $99.79, $253.20, $39.92, and $51.48 respectively if price falls two standard deviations. With prices being lognormally distributed, the probability that price falls one standard deviation is approximately 15 percent. The probability of a two standard deviation price drop is approximately one percent for all crops.
10 Two studies that have estimated aggregate costs include Smith, Goodwin, and Babcock, and Smith Babcock and Goodwin.
11 Expected returns were calculated for 2015.
12 In the context of this farm bill a five-year Olympic average is calculated by eliminating the highest and lowest values in the five years and then averaging the middle three years' values. on Developing Countries
The notation is used to explain what triggers a payment under each program and the size of the subsequent payments begins with some definitions. The parameter is a payment multiplier that the farmer chooses.
ARC
The payment formula for the Senate STAX formula is given by
RLC
The payment formula for RLC is
PLC
The payment formula for PLC is
The only difference between the Senate and House payment formulas is that House version does not allow the price to be used in the insurance guarantee to fall below $0.6871 per pound of cotton.
For a farmer who does not select ARC, SCO is designed to cover losses above the farmer's coverage level. Before an SCO payment can be made, however, the county must suffer a 10 percent loss. The payment formula for a farmer who does not select ARC is
The part of the payment formula in brackets calculates the percent loss that the county suffers. Thus the maximum payment equals the farmer's deductible percentage multiplied by projected county revenue. Historical county-level yield data from USDA NASS was collected for the five program crops, corn, cotton, rice, soybean, and wheat. Counties included in the analysis were those with reported planted acreage in 2010 and at least 25 years of yield history over the 1961 to 2010 time period. Counties with reported acreage and yields that were differentiated between irrigated and non-irrigated production practices were treated separately in the analysis, with revenue program payments estimated separately for each practice and a weighted average calculated for that county with the weights reflecting acreage allocated to each irrigation practice type. The important crops where data on irrigated yields are available are Nebraska corn and soybeans, Texas corn and cotton, and Kansas corn.
National-level yield histories for each crop were also collected over the same 50-year time period. All yield histories were detrended using a simple third degree polynomial regression function so that each historical yield observation was adjusted to an equivalent 2013 crop year level. To project expected trend yields for the 2013 to 2017 program years, a linear trend was fit to the county-level yield histories from 1980 to 2010, implying a fixed linear increase in expected yields each year.
For each crop and price policy scenario, a set of 25,000 price draws were simulated for each program year with expected levels set to those in the baseline and low price scenarios. For estimating STAX and SCO program payments the volatility, or standard deviation, of prices was calibrated to the implied volatilities used for the rating of 2012 crop revenue insurance policies. These volatilities were reduced by 15% in estimating the crop revenue program payments to reflect the lower volatility observed in the five-month NASS average prices for program crops relative to that implied by their futures and options markets.
The historical correlation between nationallevel yield deviations from trend and prices was imposed for each crop and program year.
The 50-year series of national yield deviations from trend were stacked or concatenated 500 times to provide 25,000 potential yield outcomes. Ultimately, this stacking results in 500 simulated price realizations for each specific yield observed in the 50-year history.
Farm-level yields were simulated for each county and year using the county-level yield observations. The magnitude of farm-level yield variability was assumed to be accurately measured by RMA base yield protection rates for the 2012 crop year, reported in RMA's Actuarial Data Master (ADM). To simulate farm-level yields for each county, a set of 100 normally distributed deviates were added to each county-level yield realization. The normal deviates were parameterized to have a zero-mean, and a standard deviation calibrated such that the farm-level simulated yields (county-level yields plus the normal deviates) across all available years of county yield realizations from 1961 to 2010 results in an implied insurance rate for 65% yield coverage which exactly matches the RMA base rate in the county for the same level of coverage. This approach can be interpreted as simulating farm-level yields in each year for 100 farms in each county.
Program payments were estimated for county ARC, RLC, and STAX at the county-level for each program crop. For STAX payments, each individual detrended county yield observation was matched with the corresponding years' 500 price draws. STAX payments were calculated for each of the 500 revenue realizations assuming the maximum coverage of 70 to 90% of the revenue guarantee (covering losses from 10% to 30%) and the maximum producer elected multiplier of 1.20. The revenue guarantee for each county and year was set equal to the product of the county trend yield and expected price, consistent with how guarantees are set for the GRIP insurance program. Reported program costs, or net payments, also assume an 80% subsidy level for the STAX program. 
APPENDIX B: DATA AND SIMULATION MODEL
